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Country-based pooled funds (CBPFs) are mechanisms used to receive contributions from 
multiple financial donors and allocate unearmarked resources to multiple implementing entities 
within a country (Lattimer and Swithern, 2017, p. 93). Donors use CBPFs to pool their 
contributions to support local humanitarian efforts.1 CBPFs are thought to enable the provision of 
timely, coordinated and principled assistance, and help meet The Grand Bargain commitment to 
channel by 2020 25% “of humanitarian financing to local and national responders as directly as 
possible” (2; Thomas, 2017, p. 4; Grand Bargain, 2016, p. 5). In recent years humanitarian 
CBPFs have grown in number and funding3 (Thomas, 2017, p. 4). However, the overwhelming 
majority of global humanitarian funding is provided as direct bilateral grants from donors to 
recipient organisations.4 While the volume of unearmarked pooled funds is increasing, it is not 
growing as a share of the total (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 13; Urquhart and Tuchel, 2018, p. 11). 
This rapid review provides a brief overview of the evidence on the effectiveness of CBPFs for 
humanitarian response, and recommendations of good practice. The review has looked for 
evidence on all humanitarian CBPFs, which are managed by a range of organisations. This 
review has focused on country-level funds that are set up to support humanitarian work. Although 
not covered by this review, there may be relevant learning from 1) other county-based funds 
focused on non-humanitarian development objectives, and 2) global humanitarian pooled funds.5 
The review also highlights briefly findings on other types of country-based funds – funds that are 
accessible to multiple organisations, but with financing from only one donor (Thomas, 2017).  
The review is limited to English language material and the most recent literature (published within 
the last four years). The evidence found is from a mix of reports published by organisations 
(donors and NGOs) implementing or participating in CBPFs, and some (albeit) limited 
comparative analysis.6 While the review includes findings from some individual CBPF 
evaluations, given the rapid nature of this review, there was not time to go through all individual 
fund data. The available evidence is overwhelmingly on UN CBPFs.7 There is some exploration 
of gender issues in some of the material, but no mention of disability. 
                                                   
1 Accessed 18 November 2018. https://www.unocha.org/our-work/humanitarian-financing/country-based-pooled-
funds-cbpfs 
2 Accessed 18 November 2018. https://www.unocha.org/our-work/humanitarian-financing/country-based-pooled-
funds-cbpfs 
3 Funding channelled through UN-managed pooled funds almost doubled over the past decade, reaching U$1.2 
billion in 2016 – including the global CERF as well as CBPFs (Lattimer and Swithern, 2017, p. 9). This grew to a 
record total of US$1.3 billion in 2017 (Urquhart and Tuchel, 2018, p. 11). 
4 Reportedly accounting for 90% of 2015-2016 global humanitarian response according to OCHA data (Stoddard 
et al., 2017, p 13).  
5 Such as the UN Central Emergency Response Fund and the non-governmental organisation (NGO)-managed 
START Fund 
6 There appears to be little in-depth comparative analysis of different humanitarian funding modalities or 
comparative study of humanitarian CBPFs as a whole, across the range of management organisations. Key 
studies are Stoddard et al. (2017) that looks at efficiency and inefficiency in humanitarian financing and a 
mapping and review of humanitarian pooled funds by Thomas (2017). Forthcoming studies that will update and 
strengthen the evidence base include: the global evaluation of UN CBPFs (under way 2018) and the assessment 
of the state of the humanitarian system by ALNAP (under way 2018). 
7 Including from a global evaluation of CHFs (Hidalgo et al., 2015) and ERFs (Thompson et al., 2013); MOPAN 
(2017) assessment of OCHA; donor evaluations of their use of UN CBPFs (e.g. Sida – Mowjee et al., 2016; WFP 




Use and efficacy of country based pooled funds in multi-year humanitarian funding 
compared to targeted funding for specific humanitarian emergencies: 
 Type of CBPFs: The UN manages most CBPFs (with currently 18 UN CBPFs that 
received USD 832 million in 2017, and individual fund size from USD 7–140 million). The 
EU has a couple of country-based trust funds that link humanitarian relief, rehabilitation 
and development. There are also reportedly a growing number of CBPFs managed by 
NGOs such as the Start Fund, but information is scarce and exact numbers not found. 
 Overall: UN CBPFs are a valuable mechanism to enable response to local emergency 
needs which have been improving, becoming reasonably efficient, effective funding 
mechanisms (MOPAN, 2017; Stoddard et al., 2018). However, allocative efficiencies 
(strategic coordination and ground-level decision-making) can be outstripped delays in 
approval process and heavy transaction costs – that are typically borne by the smallest 
NGOs for the least reward (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 2). Poor broader humanitarian 
coordination in a country can hinder CBPFs (Stoddard et al., 2017, pp. 24-25). 
 Multi-year funding: While CBPFs are flagged as having a role to play in achieving multi-
year predictable humanitarian financing, there are few reported instances of CBPF multi-
year funding. Some donors provide multi-year funding to CBPFs – enabling more 
innovative and strategic work – and a few CBPFs provide two or three year funding to 
recipients. However, most UN CBPF funding has had an annual decision process, with 
no guarantee of follow-on funding (Hidalgo et al., 2015, p.vi). Reportedly, the UN CBPF 
system requires adjustments to be able to manage longer-term interventions8.  
 Prioritising resources: the CBPF model can enforce field-level priority setting (across 
agencies and sectors), giving greater confidence “resources will be spent on the highest 
and most urgent priorities, delivered by the most well-positioned actor” (Konyndyk, 2018, 
p. 11). There are however some reports of donors colluding with CBPF managers to 
influence priorities. Moreover, as a small(er) proportion of the funding pool, CBPFs are 
arguably less able to leverage comparative advantage (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. x). 
 Localisation: CBPFs allocating directly to local NGOs can help donors achieve 
localisation objectives (Stoddard et al., 2018). UN CBPFs providing strategic, long-term 
support have enabled national partners to engage more meaningfully (United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 2015b; Montemurro, 2017, 
pp. 3-4). When a national fund is open to international-NGOs (INGOs) and national-
NGOs (NNGOs) there is a concern NNGOs are disadvantaged: however, opening a 
special NNGO window can involve challenges (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 26). CBPF 
overhead to NNGOs enables longer-term planning (Grisgraber, 2017, p. 5). 
 Technical efficiency: UN CBPFs have been criticised for being slow with cumbersome 
bureaucratic processes with high transaction costs for local organisations (Stoianova, 
2014; Mowjee et al., 2016, p. 32; Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 25). There have been 
improvements over time (with on average, pooled funds twice as quick as bilateral grants 
from the proposal to decision stage) but ultimately they remain constrained by inflexible 
                                                   
8 Accessed 14 November 2018. https://phap.org/thematic-notes/2016/02/humanitarian-pooled-funding-ngos-
follow-questions 
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UN Secretariat and UNDP administrative systems (MOPAN, 2017). NGO funds show a 
quick turn-around is possible (e.g. Pakistan RAPID Fund) (Thomas (2017, p. 20). 
 Flexibility:  UN CBPFs “are typically too tightly circumscribed in their role” to respond to 
changing needs, and are not particularly flexible to midstream modifications (Stoddard et 
al., 2017, p. 32). The Bêkou Trust Fund for the Central African Republic (CAR) is cited a 
useful example of built-in flexibility through direct awards of grants via expression of 
interest and direct negotiations with the fund manager (NRC et al., 2017, p. 30). 
 Risk management: OCHA increased the share of CBPF funding to national and local 
NGOs partly due to improved risk management (Montemurro, 2017, pp. 3-4). Many local 
partners do not qualify to receive direct CBPF funding, and require direct oversight by 
CBPF implementing partners – stretching the latter’s capacity (Rackley, 2015, p. 8). 
Partner Capacity Assessments (PCAs) can be demanding processes leading to high 
transaction costs for many NNGOs, affecting accessibility (Lewinsky, 2015). 
 Coherence: In the past, coherence between humanitarian CBPFs and other funds has 
been weak, with minimal linkages with other development work, but a 2017 review found 
positive examples of UN CBPFs supporting  coherence within their overall suite of 
country-level response mechanisms (Hidalgo et al., 2015, p. 10; MOPAN, 2017, p. 31).  
 Cost effectiveness: Donors assumed older UN CBPFs (the Common Humanitarian 
Funds) were less cost-effective than funding UN agency programmes directly through 
bilateral programmes (Hidalgo et al., 2015, p. 24). A review of EU CBPFs could not 
establish they were more cost-effective than EU regular external-funding instruments 
(Carrera et al., 2018, p. 9). (This rapid review did not find data on CBPF value for money; 
this may be available in individual fund evaluations.) 
 Cross-cutting: CBPF guidelines cover gender mainstreaming and accountability to 
affected populations (MOPAN, 2017, p. 73) but do not mention disability9. While UN 
CBPFs use a gender marker and usually have a gender focal point, most do not monitor 
how projects have addressed gender concerns (Mowjee et al., 2016, p. 46).  
Best practices for CBPFs: 
 Prioritise needs through a strategic, multi-year approach building on CBPF 
complementarity and coherence with other humanitarian financing and across the 
development spectrum. 
 Support national and local NGOs involvement in co-creation of funds and invest in 
building and strengthening national and local capacities. 
 Draw on existing expertise and experience, ensuring the governance structure is 
based on clear systems of authority, accountability and transparency. 
 Make CBPFs technically efficient, ensuring requirements (that incur transaction costs 
and affect timeliness of response) commensurate with the size and timelines of the 
grants, maximising flexibility to react to changing conditions. 
 Promote a culture of risk management, rather than risk avoidance with a 
harmonised, light-touch, transparent, accessible and proactive approach to PCAs, and 
invest in building local NGO risk and financial management capabilities. 
                                                   
9 This rapid review checked the Operational Handbook but has not gone through the annexes to the Handbook. 
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 Ensure transparent and accessible information and tools – to generate trust, 
collaboration and inclusivity. 
 Include guidelines, support and monitoring for fund applicants to address 
1) accountability to affected populations, 2) gender, 3) disability and 4) the impact 
of humanitarian action on the local environment within their work.  
2. Types of country-based pooled funds10 
There are currently 18 UN CBPFs which received USD 832 million in 2017.11 Previous iterations 
of UN CBPFs include the Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) – established in 1997 to provide 
rapid and flexible funding for unforeseen, sudden-onset humanitarian emergencies – and the 
Common Humanitarian Funds (CHFs) – established 2006 to allocate resources against 
consolidated appeals12 (OCHA, 2015b; Maunder et al., 2014; pp. i-ii).  
In 2015, OCHA unified its practice on the UN CBPFs – issuing mandatory minimum standards 
through a Policy Instruction and Operational Handbook. Some UN CBPFs developed their own 
guidance building on the Handbook, while others refer to the global version (Thomas, 2017, p. 
10). In October 2017 a revised version of the handbook was published, following consultation 
with fund managers and other stakeholders. Another round of revisions were planned to start in 
2018 to “introduce major changes to the current business process stemming from commitments 
made at the World Humanitarian Summit and in line with the Grand Bargain”.13  
For many of the UN CBPFs, the managing agent is OCHA. For some former CHFs (including in 
CAR, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan and Sudan) the managing agent is 
UNDP and the administrative agent is the UNDP Multi Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) Office (OCHA, 
2015b; Hidalgo et al., 2015, p. iv). This office manages around 100 funds, including other 
development-focused national multi-donor trust funds and stand-alone UN Joint Programmes, as 
well as the humanitarian CBPFs (Thomas, 2017, p. 22). 
Since 2013, the EU has managed CBPFs – termed EU Trust Funds (EUTFs) – that link 
humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and development, and are set up outside the EU budget 
(Thomas, 2017, p. 24). There are few EUTFs and they are all unique in how they are managed 
(Thomas, 2017). This rapid desk review found little data on them online and no publicly available 
evaluations of their operations. Thomas’ 2017 mapping lists two country-based EUTFs (the 
Bêkou Trust Fund in CAR –– and a fund in Colombia), and another two regional funds.  
                                                   
10 This section draws on a 2017 mapping of CBPFs for the Norwegian Refugee Council (Thomas, 2017). 
11 From the first UN CBPF set up in 1997 in Angola, donors have contributed over $6 billion to 27 UN CBPFs 
since then (OCHA, 2018, p. 2). In 2017 the top ten largest UN CBPFs are: Yemen (USD 140m); Turkey (USD 
95m); South Sudan (USD 64m); Ethiopia (USD 63m); DRC (USD 40m); Sudan (USD 40m); Iraq (USD 39m); 
Somalia (USD 35m); Syria (USD 36m); oPt (USD 25m); Afghanistan (USD 24m); CAR (USD 21m); Nigeria (USD 
20m); Myanmar (USD 14m); Jordon (USD 7.6m); and Lebanon (USD 7.4m). The top ten donors are: UK; 
Sweden; the Netherlands; Germany; Belgium; Ireland; Norway; United States; Denmark; Saudi Arabia. Accessed 
12 November 2018. https://www.unocha.org/our-work/humanitarian-financing/country-based-pooled-funds-cbpfs 
12 Both providing unearmarked funding at country level, the ERF dispersed less than US$10 million per country 
per year, with smaller grant sizes (less than US$500 000) than the CHF which had an annual fund size of around 
US$50–120 million per country and grants (Maunder et al., p. ii). 
13 Accessed 18 November 2018. https://www.unocha.org/our-work/humanitarian-financing/country-based-pooled-
funds-cbpfs/cbpfs-guidelines  
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There are also NGO-managed CBPFs. This review has not found a comprehensive mapping of 
these but Thomas (2017) provides some examples. One prominent case is the £10 million Start 
Fund Bangladesh, designed to enable aid agencies to respond early and fast to under-the-radar 
emergencies. The fund was set up in 2017 by the Start Network with funding from the UK 
government, as a pilot for the Start Network’s intention to move to decentralised national and 
regional hubs. Start Fund Bangladesh is expected to extend to a growing number of NNGOs 
during its initial four-year life span, ultimately becoming an independent local fund (Patel and Van 
Brabent, 2017, p. 24; Thomas, 2017)14. As of September 2018, Start Fund Bangladesh has 
addressed seven small/medium emergencies, reaching around 0.2 million people through 
awarding more than £2.16 million to 14 of its member agencies and their partners.15 Another 
example of a NGO-managed CBPF is the Responding to Pakistan’s Internally Displaced (RAPID) 
Fund established in 2009 by Concern Worldwide and USAID to provide rapid access to NGOs – 
and particularly NNGOs – to address gaps and overlooked needs. The second phase ran 2013-
2016, with grants from USD 5,000–300,000. 
3. Effectiveness of country based pooled funds 
Recent reviews find UN CBPFs have improved year on year, “becoming reasonably efficient and 
effective funding mechanisms” and provide “a valuable mechanism to enable responses to local 
needs in emergencies” (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 2416; MOPAN, 2017, p. 17). 
However, Stoddard et al. (2017, p. 2) highlighted that while pooled fund grants were decided 
more quickly than grants from bilateral donors17, CBPF allocative efficiencies (strategic 
coordination and ground-level decision-making) can be outstripped by technical inefficiencies. 
These include delays at with the approval process and heavy transaction costs typically borne by 
the smallest NGOs for the smallest and shortest-duration grants (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 2). 
When interviewed in 2016 the Oxfam Humanitarian Funding Manager18 reported that three main 
questions for NGOs on “the UN-led pooled funds system” were: “how to make it more accessible 
for those that are best placed to respond, how to make it more flexible, and how to make it more 
timely”.19 
CBPFs’ performance is linked to the quality of the coordinated humanitarian structures in each 
country: “Poor humanitarian coordination in a country can hinder CBPFs, but conversely, well-run 
                                                   
14 Accessed 18 November 2018. https://reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/new-bangladesh-emergency-fund-will-
enable-rapid-response-humanitarian-crises  
15 Accessed 18 November 2018. https://startnetwork.org/start-fund/bangladesh  
16 This study by Humanitarian Outcomes looked at efficiency and inefficiency in humanitarian financing. It 
compared the technical and allocative efficiency of the main humanitarian funding modalities (public and private 
direct grants and global and country-level pooled funding mechanisms). This was an extensive quantitative and 
qualitative study that looked at global data, and undertook an extensive literature review and three case studies 
(including field trips): Ethiopia (2016), Iraq (2016), and Myanmar (2015 floods).  (Stoddard et al., 2017) 
17 Stoddard et al. (2017) found that, albeit with variations by donor, overall the direct granting modality provides 
larger and relatively predictable contributions, with high transaction costs for some donors’ grants balanced by 
(larger) size of the grants. However, compared to the other funding modalities, “direct grants are slower and 
tending to be channelled through larger channels, regardless of whether this is the most direct and efficient way 
for funding to reach the actor best placed to implement” (Stoddard et al. 2017, p. 14). 
18 Oxfam is represented at the Pooled Fund Working Group and co-chairs the NGO Dialogue Platform on 
Country-Based Pooled Funds 
19 Accessed 13 November 2018. https://phap.org/thematic-notes/2017/07/ngos-engagement-pooled-funds-
interview-ben-garbutt 
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and well applied CBPF can help to strengthen coordination structures by incentivizing actors and 
underpinning a strategic plan”. In Ethiopia, “the CBPF provides an efficiency benefit at the 
strategic, system level. This was not the case in Iraq, where difficulties are rooted in broader 
coordination failure” (Stoddard et al., 2017, pp. 24-25).  
Multi-year funding 
CBPFs have a potential role to play in achieving multi-year predictable humanitarian financing20 
(NRC et al., 2017, p. 30). Yet instances of CBPF multi-year funding remain rare, with apparently 
little systematic evaluation of their effects. Development Initiatives (2015, p. 3) found that while 
many UN-coordinated Strategic Response Plans (SRPs) are now set out over two- or three-year 
periods, multi-year funding from donors is lagging behind, with the majority still continuing with 
funding cycles of 12–18 months. 
However, some donors – such as DFID, Sida – are providing multi-year funding to CBPFs 
(Hidalgo et al., 2015, p. vi). According to DFID’s 2014 Annual Review of the Ethiopia HRF, the 
HRF Unit claim that they could be more innovative, creative and strategic, with more predictable 
sources of funding.  (DFID, 2014, p. 18).  
Over the years, UN CBPFs have funded small projects across numerous sectors through an 
annual decision process, with no guarantee of follow-on funding (Hidalgo et al., 2015, p.vi). 
OCHA’s 2014 vision paper states that “CBPFs will offer opportunities for multi-annual funding, in 
alignment with multi-year SRPs, allowing for better planning and longer-term engagement”21 
(OCHA, 2014, p. 3). However, the UN CBPF Policy Instruction and Operational Handbook do not 
mention multi-annual funding. The Operational Handbook states that “Projects funded through 
reserve allocation should be implemented within a maximum of 12 months. Exceptions to this 
timeframe can be made by the HC [Humanitarian Coordinator] based on prevailing 
circumstances” (OCHA, 2017, p. 22). Reportedly the maximum duration of 12 months was to 
match the timeframe of most Humanitarian Response Pans but “this may change in the future 
with changes to the system’s ability to plan, monitor and fund longer-term interventions”.22 
According to NRC et al. (2017), the DRC CBPF has been providing two-year funding agreements 
for a number of years. However, the study highlights that “the realities of the wider funding 
context challenge the operational value of its multi-year aspirations”. Decreasing funds led to a 
shift in the balance between the standard allocation and reserve allocation windows, with the 
availability of funds for multi-year programming through the standard allocation window “very 
small considering the magnitude of the demand” (NRC et al., 2017, p. 30). 
The Bêkou Trust Fund is able to issue contracts of up to three years in duration (NRC et al., 
2017, p. 30).  
                                                   
20 The available qualitative and quantitative evidence (albeit limited and in some cases very context specific) 
indicates multi-year humanitarian funding can result in cost efficiencies throughout the disaster management 
cycle, delivering cost effectiveness in terms of outcomes as well as facilitating interventions with longer term 
impacts (Cabot Venton, 2013, p. 3). 
21 In the past CHFs reportedly only gave NGOs a maximum of 7 months to implement the CHF-funded project, 
while ERF allocations tended to be for only 6 months (Cabot Venton, 2013, p. 39). 




Konyndyk (2018, p. 11) finds that the CBPF model – where the humanitarian coordinator and an 
advisory board that includes donor and agency representatives decide funding allocations 
independent of agency mandates – realigns incentives by forcing field-level priority setting 
(across agencies and sectors) based on a comprehensive view of needs. This means agencies 
(UN or NGO) must make the case for funding based on ground-level determinations of priorities 
and delivery capacity (rather than global mandates or sector prerogatives). This can give a donor 
greater confidence that “their resources will be spent on the highest and most urgent priorities, 
delivered by the most well-positioned actor” (Konyndyk, 2018, p. 11).  
However, Stoddard et al. (2017, p. 27) reported “agencies have complained of donors colluding 
with the managers of the pooled funds to incentivize actors to change tack and work in areas that 
they deem underserved—perceived as gainsaying the agencies’ judgement on where and how to 
program” (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 27). Moreover, “As bilateral grants led the surge in funding 
over the past few years, however, pooled funds are becoming a smaller and smaller percentage 
of the total funding pool and arguably less relevant and less able to leverage comparative 
advantage and add value as part of a diverse “funding ecosystem”” (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. x). 
Localisation and inclusivity 
Stoddard et al. (2017, p. 3) found “country-based pooled funds, where they are functioning well 
and allocating directly to local NGOs, may be a means for some donors to achieve subsidiarity 
and localization objectives while avoiding the trade-off inefficiencies of managing numerous small 
grants to local entities”. UN CBPFs have started to preferentially fund NGOs, particularly 
NNGOs, when possible and efficient/effective to do so23 (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 17).  
Issues highlighted in the literature on effective localisation through CBPFs are: 
 CBPF support with a strategic and long-term remit is important to enable national 
partners to engage more meaningfully (OCHA, 2015b; Montemurro, 2017, pp. 3-4). 
Thomas (2017, p. 13) found the CBPF NGO Dialogue Platform (created in 2014) and 
NGO participation in the Pooled Fund Working group has helped greater dialogue 
between OCHA and NGOs. Poole (2018, p. 15) notes that “an unanticipated by-product” 
has been the opportunities for CSOs to take part in the decision-making of the OCHA 
managed CBPFs, through participatory governance structures. 
In South Sudan, in 2015-16, OCHA supported NNGOs to better understand and engage 
with the humanitarian coordination system, including several briefings and orientation 
sessions on the Humanitarian Fund (HF) (Montemurro, 2017, pp. 5-6). Local groups in 
Syria also reported ‘worthwhile’ training from OCHA as part of the HF application and 
award processes. However, many Syrian groups also wanted longer, more programme-
specific support (e.g. through mentoring on challenges such as effective advocacy and 
                                                   
23 Volumes of CBPF funding to NGOs and their share of total allocations increased from US$196 million (51% of 
the total) in 2014 to US$412 million (61%) in 2016 to USD 432 million (67%) in 2017 (Lattimer and Swithern, 
2017, p. 78; Urquhart and Tuchel, 2018, p. 49).  International NGOs (INGOs) received the largest share of CBPF 
allocations to NGOs (67%), with 30% provided to national or local NGOs and 3% to southern INGOs (Urquhart 
and Tuchel, 2018, p. 49). A 2017 ICVA briefing reported that in 2015 the CBPF disbursements allocated to 
NNGOs represented more than half of the amount of tracked funds received directly by NNGOs (ICVA, 2017, p. 
2). 
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efficient information management in the current context) rather than “just a workshop or 
two” (Grisgraber, 2017, p. 5). 
 When a national fund is open to both INGOs and NNGOs there is a concern that 
NNGOs are disadvantaged (e.g. by not being able to meet the same standard of high 
quality proposals, written in English). Ideas proposed for the National Start Fund in 
Bangladesh include reserving some of the national fund for NNGOs; governance 
safeguards to ensure decision-making and response leans towards NNGOs; and starting 
with INGO involvement – to provide legitimacy and take on risk – but phasing to 
local/NNGOs to become wholly national over time (Patel and Van Brabent, 2017, p. 25). 
The experience of the Iraq Humanitarian Fund (IHF) in opening a special window for 
NNGOs demonstrates the challenges involved. At the global level, understanding is that 
contributions to a pooled fund are as standard not earmarked; running contrary to this 
meant that the IHF’s NNGO earmarked contributions were “the subject of lengthy 
negotiations with OCHA and inefficient on the supply side” (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 26). 
 In Syria and Somalia local NGOs reported appreciation of the UN CBPF overhead 
policy, which allows them to use a small percentage of the allocation for overheads24 (a 
first for many NNGOs) (Grisgraber, 2017, p. 5). As a result, the Syrian groups were able 
to plan longer-term projects and reduce their dependency on larger partner funding 
decisions (Grisgraber, 2017, p. 5). 
 Transparency could be improved. There is limited information sharing between 
CBPFs, and no repository of good practice to guide the creation of new funds (Thomas, 
2017, p. 32). Even for individual UN CBPFs, information – on guidance, application 
procedures, governance, annual reports, complaints mechanisms, or contact information 
– can be spread over different websites (Thomas, 2017, p. 13). For the EUTFs, finding 
information related to the application process, what the funding criteria are and what kind 
of reporting may be required, is challenging (Thomas, 2017, p. 24). Furthermore, each 
EUTF is developing its own results-monitoring framework, with different systems, apps 
and websites (Carrera et al., 2018, p. 10).   
Technical efficiency – timeliness, transaction costs 
UN CBPFs have been criticised for slow processing of applications and fund disbursements 
(Stoianova, 2014; Mowjee et al., 2016, p. 32). OCHA disbursement for CBPFs were 34% in 2015 
against a target of 85% (MOPAN, 2017, p. 14). Other bureaucratic issues affecting fund 
availability include:  
 CBPF funding cycles (aligned with donor administrative years) impacting on the CBPF’s 
ability to respond to predictable needs (e.g. the Ethiopian seasonal calendar) (Stoddard 
et al., 2017, p. 26); 
 Long delays in auditing CBPF funded projects leaving a significant number of local 
groups unable to apply for more funding (cited by Syrian NGOs) (Grisgraber, 2017, p. 6). 
 Limited accessibility for local NGOs (e.g. online applications in English required by the 
Myanmar Humanitarian Fund) (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 25). 
                                                   
24 UN CBPF overhead policy “offers equal treatment to international/national and local actors. Maximum of 7% of 
direct expenditures, non-earmarked” (Rana, 2017, p. 7).  
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Stoddard et al. (2017, p. 25) found while UN CBPFs have variable performance on rapidity of 
funding, they typically improve over time. On average, pooled funds were twice as quick as 
bilateral grants from proposal to decision stage, but disbursement approvals were slow at times.  
However, MOPAN (2017, p. 14, 18, 77) concluded, that while efforts have been made to address 
disbursement rates, ultimately UN Secretariat and UNDP administrative systems can limit 
flexibility and lead to bureaucratic delays, and challenge NGO accessibility. OCHA Funding 
Coordination Section and ICVA (2015) provides a summary of NGO challenges to accessing 
country-based pooled funds. This analysis was intended to inform and improve the new CBPF 
guidelines. However, Thomas (2017, p. 32) found almost two years after publication, UN CBPF 
guidelines were still not fully understood by everyone. Thomas (2017, p. 32) suggested 
simplifying to ensure wider adoption and avoid unnecessary complications being added at the 
country level. 
UN CBPFs grants have tended to be smaller, on average, than bilateral or global pooled fund 
grants, in part due to their objective of funding smaller crises and smaller local organisations 
when best suited to respond (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 25). Stoddard et al. (2017, p. 26) pointed 
out that “the smaller the grant, the larger the relative transaction costs, which are all the same in 
the CBPF system no matter the amount of the grant”, meaning that “the smallest NGOs typically 
bear the greatest administrative burden for the least reward”.  
There have been experiments with UN CBPF rapid response windows (e.g. to disburse funds 
within 24 hours) (Mowjee et al., 2016, p. 32). The Ethiopia CBPF pre-positioned small amounts 
of funding (around USD 20,000) with agencies to allow immediate response to crises based on a 
phone call or email approval (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 25). This reportedly had a substantial 
impact in the first hours and days of a crisis for a relatively small amount of money, but was 
decided to be “too high a corporate risk” to continue (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 25). 
Meanwhile several NGO funds achieve a quick turn-around. Thomas (2017, p. 20) reports the 
Pakistan RAPID Fund had clear procedures and a relatively short time line for decision-making 
(approximately two weeks from receipt of application to final approval).  Development Initiatives 
(2015, p. 8) recommended investing in “NGO-led pooled funds that provide innovation and 
complementarity to those led by multilaterals in terms of focus, agility and balance of recipients”.  
Flexibility  
Stoddard et al. (2017, p. 32) found UN CBPFs tend to be “too tightly circumscribed in their role” 
to respond to changing needs, despite aspirations. NGOs reported that changes of more than 
15% of project budgets required the approval of the Humanitarian Coordinator, a process which 
can take some time to finalise. However, recent improvements in the UN CBPF guidelines 
(budget and template structure) have reduced the need for changes (ICVA, 2017). 
NRC et al. (2017) reported that “the Bêkou Trust Fund for the CAR “provides a useful example of 
a transitional mechanism working on recovery priorities with flexibility built in from the design 
stage”. It provides flexibility through direct awards of grants: there is no need to call for proposals 
(expressions of interest are welcomed). Once an NGO is pre-selected based on the expressions 
of interest, they can enter into direct negotiation with the fund manager. The Fund apparently has 
greater flexibility and speed than funds contracted directly from the European Development Fund 
(NRC et al., 2017, p. 30). However, the average funding cycle is only 5-6 months and there is a 
preference for providing bigger grants, favouring international organisations, like UN agencies.  
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Risk management 
MOPAN (2017) praised the rigour of OCHA financial management systems (with clear, public 
criteria for fund allocations), while noting this entails constraints. Montemurro (2017, pp. 3-4) 
found OCHA was able to increase the share of CBPF funding to national and local NGOs as a 
result – among others – of improved risk management in the field and at headquarters, including 
the implementation of much more robust accountability frameworks and risk management 
systems on the ground. Donors have worked with OCHA to strengthen CBPF risk management 
systems, including through external validation exercises such as commissioned by Sida following 
corruption cases in the Somalia and DRC CBPFs (Mowjee et al., 2016, p. 49). 
Rackley (2015, p. 8) found most local partners do not qualify to receive direct CBPF funding25 
due to a lack of strong financial management and reporting systems. They require direct 
oversight by CBPF implementing partners, which can stretch CBPF partners’ capacity “to the 
point of vulnerability”.  
A review of PCAs found they can be demanding, lengthy, opaque processes, often preceded by 
extensive due diligence requirements and risk assessments, leading to high transaction costs 
and barriers of entry for many NNGOs (Lewinsky, 2015). NGOs have raised the need to improve 
the structure and provision of PCA feedback to NGOs (ICVA, 2017). 
Coherence and complementarity 
The 2015 global evaluation found coherence between CHF allocation priorities and other 
development multi-donor funds was weak, rarely extending beyond linkages in project outcomes 
(Hidalgo et al., 2015, p. 10). MOPAN (2017, p. 31) reported that ERFs made only minimal 
contributions to resilience and disaster preparedness, but there was some progress in integrating 
components of resilience programming in humanitarian responses within CHF funds. Reviewing 
three evaluations of UN CBPFs, Mopan (2017, p. 31) found all three concluded each CBPF 
“functions well as part of an overall suite of response mechanisms at the country level, and 
supports coherence”.  
The EU Bêkou Fund is seen as a positive example for trying to ensure: (NRC et al., 2017, p. 30) 
 Complementarity between the EU Fund and the UN CBPF in CAR. 
 Bridging humanitarian and development needs, through attracting contributions from 
both humanitarian and development donors, and from a variety of EU development and 
migration budget lines and funds and humanitarian funds from ECHO. 
 Coherence across funding streams with ECHO on the operational committee and 
consulted in funding allocation decisions.  
 Alignment with strategic national priorities with CAR government on the trust fund board. 
                                                   
25 The results of capacity assessments and monitoring measures have meant a decrease in the number of 
national and local partners in a couple of instances. In Somalia the Humanitarian Fund went from 74 national 
partners between 2010 and 2013 to 38 in 2014 and 37 in 2016, but increased to 60 by mid-2017. (Montemurro, 
2017, p. 4) 
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Cost-effectiveness 
In the past, there has been an assumption on behalf of donors that older UN CBPFs (the CHFs) 
are less cost-effective with high transaction costs compared with funding UN agency 
programmes directly through bilateral programmes (Hidalgo et al., 2015, p. 24).  
A review of EUTFs found that “Despite the European Commission’s readiness to use all existing 
flexibilities in management of the EUTFs, it could not be established that the EUTFs carry out 
implementation more quickly than the EU’s regular external-funding instruments. The delegated 
cooperation comes in principle with rather high overall management costs; hence, it is not 
apparent prima facie that EUTFs are more cost-effective.” (Carrera et al., 2018, p. 9). 
This review found little assessment of CBPF value for money. OCHA strategic review indicators 
do not mention value for money; cost effectiveness is one of the criteria (OCHA, 2017, p. 19). 
Cross-cutting issues 
CBPF guidelines have sections on gender mainstreaming and accountability to affected 
populations, though not environmental sustainability and climate change (MOPAN, 2017, p. 73). 
Furthermore, UN CBPF guidelines do not mention disability. Other findings for CBPFs include: 
 Partners are asked to describe in project proposals how affected populations and specific 
beneficiaries will be involved throughout the project cycle, while CBPF reporting and 
monitoring procedures seek to verify how this has been applied during implementation. 
CBPFs are required to establish a formal complaint mechanism to receive feedback from 
stakeholders who believe they have been treated incorrectly or unfairly during any of the 
Fund’s processes. (OCHA 2017, p. 49) This rapid review has found no information on the 
effectiveness of this approach to accountability to affected populations. 
 While CBPFs use a gender marker and usually have a gender focal point to verify the 
scoring in proposals, most do not report on how projects have addressed gender 
concerns. Afghanistan and Somalia looked at gender challenges and gender monitoring 
in their 2014 annual reports (Mowjee et al., 2016, p. 46). 
 The Afghanistan CBPF has introduced an Environment Marker, making it mandatory for 
all applicants to consider the impact of humanitarian action on the local environment and 
develop tailored mitigation strategies (Mowjee et al., 2016, p. 48). 
4. Good practice and recommendations  
These recommendations are drawn from the literature reviewed. In addition there is detailed 
instruction in the OCHA global guidelines for CBPFs – which is not summarised here as it is set 
out clearly in the OCHA revised operational handbook and annexes.26  
Prioritisation of needs 
                                                   
26 Accessed 21 November. https://www.unocha.org/our-work/humanitarian-financing/country-based-pooled-
funds-cbpfs/cbpfs-guidelines  
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 Undertake a comprehensive needs assessment to identify needs and priorities for a 
new fund; avoid duplicating existing instruments; and help build an effective division of 
labour among donors (European Court of Auditors, 2017, p. 14). 
 Consider how the CBPF fits with the overall country and donor portfolio – 
maintaining the widest possible range of options and tools to employ for different needs. 
Stoddard et al. (2017, p. 3) sets out possible scenarios and financing modalities. 
 Support strategic multi-year funding in line with moves towards multi-year SRPs, to 
support increased predictability, better planning, greater flexibility and responsiveness, 
lower operational costs, as outlined by the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles27 
(Hidalgo et al., 2015, p. x; Thomas, 2017, p. 33; NRC et al., 2017).  
 Build on CBPF complementarity and coherence: with governments’ strategic 
priorities; between the various humanitarian funds and other financing; across 
humanitarian and development funding; across donors and their various funding 
modalities (Thomas, 2017, p. 31).  
Support national and local NGOs  
 Involve NNGOs early on in co-creation and co-design. This creates a strong sense of 
shared ownership and joint responsibility (Patel and Van Brabant, 2017). 
 Invest in building and strengthening national and local capacities. This involves 
developing relationships and thinking bigger than just access to funding – how else can 
NGOs become involved in the CBPF mechanism? Are there seats available on the 
advisory board at the local level? (ICVA, 2017).  
 Manage the relationship dynamic at work within CBPFs between INGOs and 
NNGOs. Independent third parties may be useful to provide a supporting role (Patel and 
Van Brabant, 2017). Learn from experiences of earmarked national funding windows. 
 Provide an element of unrestricted funding in partnerships with local 
organisations. (Grisgraber, 2017) 
 Be transparent – with accessible information and tools – to generate trust, 
collaboration and inclusivity (Thomas, 2017, p. 32). Helpful aids include: in-country 
information sessions; simple graphical illustrations, process overviews and FAQs on a 
CBPF’s website; trainings for national partners (including peer learning and dedicated 
sessions); providing an Internet connection for partners at the Fund’s office; twice-weekly 
clinics on grant management systems (Thomas, 2017, pp. 27-28, 31; Lewinsky, 2015). 
Governance  
 Share information and draw on existing expertise28, structures and experience. For 
example, new pooled funds could (Thomas, 2017, p. 33; Poole, 2018, p. 28): 
- Consider – and adapt to the actors, requirements and priorities of a given setting 
– common structural features and functions of CBPFs.29 
                                                   
27 Accessed 14 November 2018. https://www.ghdinitiative.org/ghd/gns/best-practices.html 
28 E.g. UN facilitated Pooled Fund Working Group which brings together donors, NGOs and UN agencies 
Accessed 29 October 2018. https://reliefweb.int/report/world/about-country-based-pooled-funds-enar 
29 . Key elements include: 1) Steering Committee/Board (providing strategic oversight and responsibility for risk 
management); 2) Secretariat (formulate policy direction and guidelines); 3) Managing Agent (for day-to-day 
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- Consider contracting a management entity experienced in managing pooled 
funds, instead of creating another secretariat or support unit, which requires 
significant investments. 
 Establish a common understanding of the CBPF’s purpose, priorities and 
mechanisms to build greater collaboration and cooperation, as seen with NGO 
funds, like the Start Fund. Involving stakeholders when setting priorities and establishing 
mechanisms is an important means of building confidence and trust in the fund and its 
mechanisms (Thomas, 2017, p. 30). 
 Ensure the governance structure is based on clear systems of authority, 
accountability and transparency, with a clear division of labour between different 
governance entities – in particular between strategic/”custodian” and management 
functions (Poole, 2018, p. 28). Carrera et al. (2018, pp. 8-9) recommended  explicitly 
excluding implementing organisations from CBPF governing bodies – learning from 
EUTF experience of having EUTF contributors – the European Commission and Member 
states – sit on boards and operational committees.  
 Set up a dedicated donor office to ensure consistent governance and management 
across the CBPFs managed by the donor, following the example of the UNDP Multi 
Donor Trust Fund Office (Carrera et al., 2018, p. 10).  
 Establish a formal complaint mechanism for stakeholders who believe they have 
been treated incorrectly or unfairly by the CBPF (Thomas, 2017, p. 10).  
Management 
 Tackle disproportionate donor requirements and inflexibility that hinders efficiency 
at all levels. Initiate internal agency reforms to remediate long delays from initial award 
to onward contracting and disbursement to partners. (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 2) 
 Improve the technical efficiency of CBPFs and make CBPF requirements (that 
incur transaction costs) commensurate with the size and timelines of the grants, 
maximising flexibility to react to changing conditions, within limits set by “appropriate 
accountability controls and pragmatic risk management” (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 3). 
Efforts could involve:  
- Adequate planning, with clear time frames, and systems set-up in advance on 
proposals, decision-making, and disbursements of funds (Thomas, 2017, p. 31); 
- Making the process as light and ’user friendly’ as possible – one example is the 
Start Fund’s quick decision-making and disbursal process (Thomas, 2017, p. 30); 
- Having minimum grant thresholds (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 32); 
- Simplifying PCAs – e.g. by sharing between UN agencies; accepting other 
donors’ assessments; or agreeing on one simplified partner assessment between 
CBPFs and at least UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP (Thomas, 2017, pp. 31, 33); 
- Increasing multi-year funding, with built-in modifier systems to allow partners to 
adapt to changing circumstances without undergoing time-consuming formal 
modifications, could similarly bolster flexibility and speed. (Stoddard et al., p. 32). 
                                                                                                                                                              
operations); 4) Technical Review Committee (sector-specific guidance/review of implementing partners’ 
proposals and reports; 5) PCA Agent; 6) Monitoring Agent (Poole, 2018, p. 29). 
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- Provide “greater “pre-positioned” funding with individual agencies and/or 
multiagency consortia capable of putting the money to work immediately in the 
event of a sudden crisis” (Stoddard et al., p. 2). 
Risk management 
 Promote a culture of risk management, rather than risk avoidance (Poole, 2018). 
 Consider early and midway monitoring to identify risk management issues. 
Proactive monitoring of operations (from proposal to allocation to delivery) as opposed to 
end-of-program evaluations can improve how risk is being handled institutionally and 
collectively, and provide course corrections (Rackley, 2015, p. 3). 
 Ensure PCAs and due diligence procedures are proportional to the often smaller 
scale operations of NNGOs and their less advanced organisational systems (Lewinsky, 
2015). Strive for a harmonised, light-touch, transparent, accessible and proactive risk 
management approach to CBPF PCAs. Emerging good practice available from Pakistan 
RAPID fund; Partnership Initiative Turkey; EU Bêkou Trust Fund, OCHA Somalia, 
START – Financial Enablers Philippines (Lewinsky, 2015). 
 Increase funding for risk and financial management capacity training for local 
NGOs to further localisation of the aid agenda (Rackley, 2015, p. 3). PCAs provide an 
opportunity to identify capacity development needs, with CBPF managers engaging in an 
honest feedback with partners. Feedback may also provide useful insights as to capacity-
development trends and needs in each context (Montemurro, 2017, p. 9). 
 Tap into creative ideas of national stakeholders on how to deal with practical 
challenges, including ‘due diligence’ and ‘risk’, in ways that fit the context, with national 
stakeholders taking active responsibility (Patel and Van Brabant, 2017, p. 24). 
Cross-cutting issues 
 Include guidelines and support for fund applicants to consider and develop tailored 
mitigation strategies for 1) accountability to affected populations, 2) gender, 3) 
disability and 4) the impact of humanitarian action on the local environment – and 
monitor implementation (MOPAN, 2017; Mowjee et al; 2016). 
5. Other humanitarian country-based funds 
There are other country-based humanitarian financing instruments that do not fit the 
standard definition of CBPFs (that is multiple donors to a fund that allocates to multiple entities). 
Other funding mechanisms include funds that have a single donor. These include “’umbrella 
grants’ from a single donor to an individual NGO or NGO consortium – or – as in the case of the 
DFID fund in Myanmar – to a commercial contractor (Thomas, 2017, p. 9). The receiving entity is 
legally responsible for the funds and puts in place procedures and systems to manage and 
disburse the funds (Thomas, 2017, p. 9). 
Stoddard et al. (2017, p. 27) find that bilaterally funded instruments involving prearranged 
partners set up by donors at country (or global level) can be quite technically efficient in terms of 
speed and limited transaction costs: “When they work well, these consortia and framework 
agreements are considered the second or third fastest way to mobilize money (after internal 
reserves and the Start Fund)”. There were occasional NGO feedback that these modalities did 
not always reduce transaction costs because of the amount of internal discussion required. 
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One example of this kind of country-based fund is the Humanitarian and Resilience Programme 
Facility (HARP-F) in Myanmar. With a GBP 60 million budget from 2016-2020 for protracted 
conflict-related crises and natural disasters30, this is the first instance of DFID using a commercial 
contractor (Crown Agents) to manage a humanitarian financing facility (NRC et al., 2017, p. 31). 
HARP-F can fund local NGOs directly on a multi-year basis (Stoddard et al., 2017, p. 28). The 
2018 Interim Assessment found HARP-F has been able to deal with a large number of grants to 
local /national organisations; focus on capacity building of organisations in tandem with grant-
making; undertake greater scrutiny and quality assurance of projects; and complementary 
research (Bhattacharjee and Hale, 2018, p. 4). Overhead costs have been in line with other 
funds in the country. Issues have included the lack of an effective process by Crown Agents, 
HARP-F and DFID to communicate key information, resolve differences and make timely 
decisions, with complaints of micro-management by DFID (Bhattacharjee and Hale, 2018, p. 4). 
Recommendations include DFID and HARP-F establishing “clear parameters, mutual 
expectations and red lines for development of partner proposals” (Bhattacharjee and Hale, 2018, 
p. 5). 
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